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RECENT CASES
DEATH-DISTRIBUTION OF AMOUNT RECOVERED-REASONABLE
COMPENSATION FOR PAIN AND SUFFERINc--Deceased lived for
nine hours after being injured in an automobile collision. The
plaintiff, administratix of the estate of deceased, brought this action
under the wrongful death statute and originally claimed pecuniary
loss to a surviving widow and damages for conscious pain and
suffering. The claim for the surviving widow was withdrawn and
no testimony was offered at the trial as to existence of any surviving
heirs. The jury returned a verdict of $10,000 which the judge con-
cluded was for decedent's pamn and suffering. The trial judge then
ordered a remission to $5,000 which was affirmed on appeal by a
divided court. French v Mitchell, 140 N.W 2d 426 (Mich. 1966)
The Michigan wrongful death statute provides for recovery of
damages for conscious pain and suffering and in this case the
Michigan Supreme Court in interpreting the statute had no trouble
in reaching the conclusion that under the statute recovery for con-
scious pamn and suffering is permitted when no heirs survive.' The
measure of recovery under wrongful death statutes is usually the
injury resulting to survivors, and thus, unless expressly provided
for, there can be no special recovery for conscious pamn and suffering,
and no action under the statute can be brought without the existence
of surviving kin.2 This is the case in North Dakota, s however,
in North Dakota and many jurisdictions, unlike in Michigan,4 all
actions for such deaths are not limited to actions under the wrongful
death statute. North Dakota's survival statute permits actions by
deceased's representative which could recover for damages suffered
by deceased before deceased's death-thus for conscious pain and
suffering.5 Furthermore, since the deceased's representative could
bring the action no heirs need survive. Thus similar actions to the
case in point could be brought in North Dakota and in most juris-
dictions.
1. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.581 and § 691.582 (1948).
2. See generally, 25A C.J.S. Death § 106 (1966).
3. Satterberg v. Minneapolis, St. P & S.S. My. Ry. Co., 19 N.D. 38, 121 N.W 70
(1909) N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-21-02 (1960).
4. MICH. COmP. LAWs § 691.581 (1948).
5. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-26.1 (1960) for other jurisdictions see generally, 15
AM. Jun. Damages § 101 (1938).
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The three opinions rendered in this case on the validity of the
trial court's remittitur set out three different views concerning a
court's power to substitute its view in place of the jury's. Each
opinion concedes such a power to the bench, but the requirements
as to when the power may be exercised differ The lines of dis-
tinction between the three views are narrow and in practice may
appear negligible.
The majority opinion affirms a broad judicial power by liberally
realizing a judicial duty, imposed by the legislature, to limit such
recoveries under the wrongful death statute, and by ascertaining
a public policy for guarding against excessive awards. Thus, the
majority opinion permits a judge, in an action for conscious pain
and suffering under the wrongful death statute, to set a reasonable
verdict on mere ground that he felt the jury's verdict was unreason-
able. It is an interesting discourse by which this view is reached.
In 1939 the wrongful death statute in Michigan was amended
to allow recovery of "reasonable compensation for [conscious]
pain and suffering." The qualifying word "reasonable" in the
amendment is the basis for the majority's finding of a legislatively
imposed judicial duty to limit recoveries. The majority believed this
to be the first case to interpret this qualifying word.
There is no question that the legislature has power to limit
recoveries obtained under statutory actions. Minnesota limits dam-
ages to $10,000 in wrongful death actions.7 In suit against the owner
of a vehicle for damages caused by the vehicle while operated by
another, California limits the owner's liability to $10,000 if no
master-servant relationship exists." In the instant case recovery
is statutory, but the legislature has only limited recovery for
conscious pain and suffering to a "reasonable" amount. By this one
word the majority feels that the legislature has imposed a duty on
the courts "to control such compensation to a reasonable extent"
and has given the court the right to substitute its view as to what
is reasonable in place of the jury's.
The majority, by a curious discussion of statutory liability
insurance requirements, discerns a public policy which supports this
judicial duty The majority reasons that since in the future, with
this case as precedent, such recoveries for conscious pamn and
suffering may exceed the liability coverage required of Michigan
motorists, it is imperative that this judicial duty, as seen by the
majority, be recognized and exercised. The insurance carried by
6. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.582 (1948).
7. MIrNN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02 (1945).
8. VEHICL CODE oF CALTF. § 17151.
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defendant is not properly to be considered by the jury and disclosure
or pleading of such fact in some circumstances has been held to
be reversible error 9 Michigan by statute declares that there should
be no disclosure concerning insurance during the course of the
trial.10 The matter of insurance is said to be wholly immaterial in
these cases. A further reason against such disclosure by plaintiff
is that the jury may fix liability when none exists or arrive at an
excessive amount because of the fact that the burden would not
have to be met by defendant." The rule against disclosure of insur-
ance is, however, also applied to defendant; Michigan courts have
held that the defendant cannot produce evidence to show that he is
not insured or to show the limit of his insurance. 12 Nevertheless,
in this case the Michigan Supreme Court feels that the matter of
liability insurance coverage should be taken into account for the
purpose of ascertaining public policy and setting important precedent.
Michigan is one of the few jurisdictions which allows the per
diem argument of pain and suffering damages illustrated with a
figure to be submitted to the jury 18 Thus this case could be used
in counsel's argument to present a figure (a little over $1,000 an
hour-$24,000 a day) to the jury on which they could compute the
damages. North Dakota doesn't allow a figure to be used by counsel,
although counsel may explain the per diem method to the jury 14
Thus in North Dakota this case as precedent would not present
such a threat. But, in the jurisdictions like Michigan where the
per diem argument coupled with a figure is permittedly used by
counsel, it can be said that the courts should guard against such
precedents to avoid the spiral staircase of skyrocketing verdicts.
The question presented is whether the court can and should avoid
bad precedent by recognizing a broad power in the court to sub-
stitute its view as to what is reasonable for that of the jury's
merely on the ground that to let the jury's verdict stand would
set bad precedent.
The concurring opinion concedes power to the judge to use
remittitur when the judge believes the verdict is excessive and
therefore must have been based on improper criteria. The judge
may say what is reasonable but must believe that the jury's
unreasonable verdict was arrived at by improper methods although
9. 20 AM. JUR., Evidence § 388 (1.939).
10. MICH. ComP. LAWS § 522.33 (1948).
II. Ryan v. Noble, 116 So. 766 (Fla. 1928).
12. Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Marvin, 313 Mich. 528, 21 N.W.2d 841 (1946).
13. Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311, 109 N.W.2d 828 (1961), 60 MICH. L. REV. 612
(1962).
14. King v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 107 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1961), 39 N.D.L. REV.
209 (1963).
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there is no evidence of improper methods other than the size of
verdict. The distinction between this and the majority view may
be mere judicial verbiage. The stricter of the three views is the
minority opinion which allows the judge power to adjust the verdict
only where there is a showing of the use of improper methods,
sympathy or prejudice. This opinion is concerned with the usurpation
of judgement of the duly constituted trier of fact.
North Dakota's high court's verbiage is similar to that of the
concurring opinion. The North Dakota court has spoken of "verdict
not so large or excessive as to indicate passion or prejudice by the
jury,"'15 "damages proportionate to injury,"'' and evidence bearing
a reasonable relationship to elements of injury and damages proved.1 7
The result is that the court is left with the determination of such
excessiveness, proportionateness, and reasonableness of the relation-
ship. Thus in a similar case brought in North Dakota under the
survival statute, although there are only judicial, not legislative,
pronouncements that recovery for conscious pain and suffering must
be reasonable, the North Dakota court would probably adopt the
view set forth in the concurring opinion.
The procedure of remittitur presents the question of conflict
with constitutional provision for trial by jury and while it hastens
final determination of litigation and thus lessens expense, restraint
of its excessive and indiscriminatory use has been urged. 18 The
public policy reasons for limiting the recent trend of unusually
high recoveries must be weighed against public policy considerations
in usurping right to trial by jury In this case of such a tenuous
public policy derived from the state liability insurance requirements,
the jurors as Michigan citizens who must be assumed to know these
requirements and the average coverage maintained by Michigan
drivers, should be just as capable as the court to protect the interests
of Michigan drivers. A more lucid public policy is called for in order
to usurp the right of the jury to determine the verdict.
MARIANNE MUNSON MILLOY
15. Clark v. Josephson, 66 N.W.2d 539 (N.D. 1954).
16. Henke v. Peyerl, 89 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1958).
17. Lake v. Neubauer, 87 N.W.2d 888 (N.D. 1958).
18. Conklin, Appellate Courts and the Quest for Just Compensation Additur and
Remittitur, 42 N.D. L. REV. 397 (1966).
